How Kenya, Somalia and allies can win the war against Al Shabaab this time around.

Al Shabaab fighters in a parade

Kenya army’s excursion into Somalia in pursuit of the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (or simply Al Shabaab) militia has entered into its second week. According to Kenya army, the extremists have suffered significant losses and are said to be in retreat. This, of course, is good news. But we can ensure that gains made in the coming days are more sustainable by implementing the following measures:

• Prioritize winning the battle of the mind: Winning the hearts and support of the Somali people in the entire Horn of Africa is much more important than wiping out the militia’s strongholds. This is the only way the Somali people will not see Kenya as a foreign force violating their sovereignty and occupying their land with the help of the west. Currently, this is the rhetoric the Shabaab are using to whip up patriotic emotions and further radicalize the moderates like they have successfully done in the past. Kenya and her allies must now engage diplomats to launch a concise and sustained media campaign in the Greater Somalia region. We must define this war’s narrative, craft it into acceptable rhetoric and use Somali’s local media to win the hearts and minds of all peace-loving Somali people. There is need to explain to the Somali people why Kenya and her allies are not just pursuing her interests, but are acting in the interest of peace for the Somali nation. It would be nice if Kenya’s minister for Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula accompanied by other Somali leaders gives interviews to Radio Shabelle in Mogadishu, for example. We must also engage the help of respected religious leaders in Kenya and Somalia to assure Somalis that it is not their religion under attack here.
• After chasing the Shabaab out of town, what next? The international community and regional governments should launch massive state-building programs in liberated areas to scale up the capacity of Somalia’s TFG. Aid for state-building & development from partners like the US and EU must start flowing immediately. A vacuum will only lead to the rise of opportunistic elements like the clan war lords and even the Shabaab to fill the gap, taking us back to square one. Reconstruction must begin immediately with institutions for provision of security (coupled with lifting of arms embargo on Somalia) and economic development. Aid agencies must start shifting from purely humanitarian assistance to aid for development, in large amounts! A strong government in Somalia will be able to deal with extremism, piracy and address the current fractionalization of the country into the existing tiny unviable ‘mini states’. As we do this, we must ensure that all programs and projects bear the Somali government’s stamp so that the citizens begin to have confidence in their government’s capacity to govern.
• Redefining and/or extending AMISOM mandate: In light of the recent security developments, there is need to draw a new plan for AMISOM. The proposed increase in size from current 9000 to at least 15000 should be implemented now. Areas of operation need to be extended to include strategic the towns of Baidoa, Kismayu and Afmadow. It is the high time Djibouti and Senegal sent their troops as promised. Kenya and Uganda should lead this effort at Addis to draw up a new, broader mandate for AMISOM.

In conclusion, swift, effective action is critical. Because war is a bad thing; even a seemingly just war like this one has its downside. Therefore, it must take as short a duration as possible. There are costs in terms of lives and money (better spent in developing our economy etc). Through better coordination amongst all the allies and timely logistical support, this operation should ideally be complete in under five months.

Taking the War to Al Shabaab is Right, But….

First of all, I’m not a huge fan of military adventures, especially unconventional ones featuring a stable state with a lot to lose going against armed groups from basket case states which have nothing to lose.

Kenya army at a past parade

However, I must say that I support the Kenya government’s decision to take the war to Al Shabaab at the Somalia-Kenya border, and if need be to pursue them into Somalia. In fact, this was long overdue. Al Shabaab has made daring attacks and breached our territorial integrity numerous times in the recent past, you wonder if it had to take abductions and killings of foreign nationals for the government to act.

But we need to ask ourselves several questions:

1. What is our exit strategy? Borrowing from the Colin Powell doctrine, we need to have a clear exit strategy. How long are we going to be engaged? At what point do we declare our mission over, battle won and bring back home our boys?    It is very easy for a state to bring out the guns to war, but no one wants to take them back to their bases without a clear victory; it’s very bad for a country’s image and any govt’s ratings! How long is Prof Saitoti and Yusuf Hajji prepared to keep our forces there? The key thing is to avoid an endless and costly entanglement like the US finds itself in in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. All about money: Make no mistake; military incursions cost money, tons of it. So we should all expect a spike in our Defence allocations pretty soon. And of course these will be highly secretive so we’ll never know exactly how the money is being used. Since Kenya is not like Ethiopia which gets billions in military aid from the west, it means the Kenyan taxpayer will foot this bill. Just when we were making the turn from reduced GDP growth in the face of an economic downturn… So there goes Uhuru’s austerity measures to bring down government expenditure! We need to demand a quick and decisive end to this campaign.
3. Regional support: A unilateral action can never end the Al Shabaab threat, as the Ethiopians will tell you. Coordination with other actors in the Somali conflict is paramount. How is Kenya’s campaign complementing the ongoing AMISOM’s role? How about the US and its allies who have been carrying out covert attacks on militant targets? Kenya should not try to play the hero here. Working with others will mean lower costs and spreading the attendant risks.
4. To close the border or not: Granted, there are bad elements streaming into the country. But I do not support closing the border to thousands of refugees fleeing the war and famine in Somalia. It is inhuman and against Article 31 and 33(1) on the UN Convention on Refugees. What is needed is better processing of incoming refugees coupled with greater international efforts to assist the refugees. The UNHCR must lead and do. The international community needs to channel more funds towards this because the stability and security of Kenya holds the key to a stable Horn.
5. Risk of reprisals: There is obviously the risk of reprisals from the militants, and these could come in form of suicide attacks in Kenya like we saw in Mogadishu last month. But something tells me this risk may not be that high; Kenya hosts numerous Somali refugees some of whom are suspected to be sympathizers/financiers of Al Shabaab who have also invested in the country. It would be counter-productive to bite the hand that feeds you. However, this threat can be addressed by more vigilant policing. The Kenya Police Service is the most lax force I ever saw in East Africa!
6. The real Somali problem. Let’s all remember that all these military actions are just dealing with symptoms, not causes. In fact, it is classic George Bush-Dick Cheney School of Thought; let’s pummel the extremists to smithereens and bring glorious democracy to all. There is one small problem: the extremists will begin to paint our mission as ‘desecration of their holy land’s territorial integrity by Christian nations’ and thereby whip up patriotic sympathies from moderate Somalis. This is a rhetoric that Islamists world over have used with great success, managing to recruit adherents in the face of sustained US-led military incursions. Let’s remember that majority of Somalis are actually moderate Muslims whose only reason of supporting the extremists is lack of viable alternative government. Which takes us back to the unpopular need to shore up the TFG and TFIs, with a good dose of pragmatism.
7. Do not under-estimate Al Shabaab: There are those in the Kenya government who think that Al Shabaab is some rag tag outfit only armed with AK 47s. Wrong. Al Shabaab is a quasi-government with sophisticated weaponry, thanks to military support from Eritrea (until a UN and AU arms embargo in 2010). They have excellent taxation policies in Kismayo port and until recently, Mogadishu. Also, a UN investigation unearthed a lucrative charcoal export business which brings the militants an estimated $15 million every year. They collect more revenue than the UN-backed TFG. What makes them more lethal is the fact that their fighters are well-adapted to guerilla warfare. They are willing to die for their cause; we certainly want our soldiers to come back home in one piece!

This must not be seen by policy makers in Nairobi and Addis Ababa as the silver bullet that eradicates the Shabaab threat. It should be taken as one part of a holistic regional approach that will take years before we can say that the threat is reasonably neutralized.

Godspeed Kenya Defense Forces! And resist the temptation of embarking on a ‘Liberate Somalia’ mission while there. In fact, go no more than 100km. Only Somalis can do that.
And remember, any campaign that lasts more than 5months is OCCUPATION.

China in Sudan…

(work in progress…)
A critical look at why China could play a leading role in mediating peace between the two Sudans even as it pursues its own economic interests.

Premise: That China has arguably the biggest economic leverage over the two states..

Nationbuilding in South Sudan: Lessons from Somaliland

Of all the numerous congratulatory messages that poured in from world capitals, one stood out. This was from Hargeysa, the capital of Somaliland ; that ‘republic’ that the world just refuses to recognize. It might have been an opportune moment for the Somalilanders to remind the world of their unique situation and continuing consternation at the international community’s apathy to their cause despite making major strides at statehood, peace and democratic governance.

Somaliland Pres Ahmed Mohamed

As President SalvaKiir and his government get down to business, it would be very important for South Sudan to pay attention to Hargeysa, the only African government  that offers practical lessons for the nascent government’s most arduous task; nation- and state-building in the 21^st century.

LESSON 1: Security is the foundation. Providing and guaranteeing security to all citizens and in particular businesses is paramount if any economic growth is to take place. And once businesses are making money, it automatically unlocks avenues for taxation. Somaliland realized a lucrative transit business by traders to and from Ethiopia through the Port of Berbera. The only problem with this cash cow was rampant insecurity from banditry. As long as the port and the road to it were secure, transporters could keep plying their trade and the government would collect the much-needed money to extend its control through service delivery throughout its territory. When government provides security, this acts as a compensation for civilians to give up arms. According to a 2007 Small Arms estimate, two in three civilians have a gun. As things stand, civilian disarmament is facing major challenges.

LESSON 2: Foreign aid (for development or reconstruction) is not necessarily an asset. In fact, the lack of foreign aid for Somaliland led the authorities there to form open and accountable systems of government. The government of Somaliland knows very well that unless they account for the revenues they collect from use or Port Berbera and taxes they impose on the citizens who, through their clan leaders (the Guurti) in turn agree to maintain security in their domains, they do not have any recourse. Government would consequently go bankrupt. It is common knowledge that where governments know they can survive through means other than the taxation of citizenry as seen in countries perceived to be in good donor books (like Ethiopia), there is little or no incentive for state accountability and transparency. Such authorities also tend to be autocratic. South Sudan should focus on creating an enabling environment for local manufacturing to take root and thrive. These will offer an attractive source of revenue and also provide jobs. Relying largely on oil, in my view, will be the real ‘Resource Curse’, as Paul Collier demonstrates.

LESSON 3: Do not destroy traditional governance structures.Building on the existing traditional structures of authority is much more cost-effective and less time consuming than trying to adopt totally euro-centric models from the grassroots to the top. South Sudan can learn a lot from Somaliland’s bicameral parliament where both elected representatives and national council of elders (Guurti) share power. The Guurti has played a key role in extending security within and amongst clans; something the central government lacks the capacity to. In South Sudan, traditional chiefs played a vital role in more or less the same way as in South Sudan. However, it seems like there is a deliberate effort to do away with them and adopt a modern Eurocentric governance structure. What Salva Kiir and his government needs to understand that while this is good in the long term, the new state lacks the required human

Pres Salva Kiir, ROSS

resource to run such a system in the short term. The most critical state organs bearing the brunt of this inadequacy is the judiciary and rule of law. If the traditional role of chiefs and elders is revitalized, they can play a key stop gap role to enforce law and order and mete out justice. South Sudan has to be creative in actualizing this hybrid system that is already informally in place in several areas I personally visited.

LESSON 4: Resource redistribution. Equal redistribution of benefits accrued from state resources as well as from cooperation between the citizens and the government. There is need to set up a political system that ensures freedom and accountability. In Somaliland, the central government has to ensure that revenue from taxation of traders is equally shared throughout the country especially to education institutions. South Sudan will have to ensure the same when it comes to oil revenues. A form of ‘equalization fund’ should be put in place to bring development in adversely underdeveloped places like east of the new country (Pibor, Akobo, Pochalla counties in Jonglei State) so that they are not left behind. Decentralization of resources will be critical in stemming public discord.

LESSON 5: Do not marginalize the Diaspora. If there is a constituency that has provided invaluable support to Somaliland, it is its huge diaspora spread out in Europe and North America. They have also helped to push for their motherland’s agenda in the international scene through lobbying. As South Sudan begins its task of state-building, they will need bright people with a flair for thinking global and acting local. Australia, US and UK boast large numbers of South Sudanese communities, most of them in colleges and private sectors of their adopted countries. As I noted in my earlier blog, the current composition of government officials is heavily skewed in favor of former war generals and ex-SPLA top brass. The thinking is that those in the diaspora ‘abandoned’ their people during the war and therefore shouldn’t return to claim leadership positions now that there is peace. A radical paradigm shift is required. Pres Kiir and his government must view the South Sudanese Diaspora as a huge asset and partner in reconstruction of the new country and as such, put in place to enhance this cooperation.

In conclusion, it is my personal observation that the AU needs to seriously put in place a procedure to allow Somaliland sovereignty. After all, theirs is a cause with reasonable historical justification for sovereignty.

The Four Main Challenges the new ROSS Faces

The last bottle has been emptied; the bulls have been devoured to the tail; almost everyone has gone back to work. Now let’s have some reality check. All aboard. The new Republic of Southern Sudan is on the runway ready for take-off into the horizons on economic growth, peace and stability. Unfortunately, the weather outlook points to some serious navigation challenges especially for the pilots. I have tried to capture and greatly compress these challenges into four main ones that pose the greatest impediment to a smooth flight.

1. A Lousy northern neighbor (and the Small Matter of the Border)

The Khartoum ruling elite are an unhappy lot. They just lost the goose that laid the golden egg and for the first time in many years, they have to think of an austerity plan to avoid a serious economic downturn marked by dwindling fortunes. The South has no intention of continuing with the oil revenue sharing. Political dissent is rising and major opposition parties are more daring in their

Pres Bashir

call for reforms and even regime change in the North. Pres Bashir is still wanted by the ICC. So, how do they survive in the face of all this? They will do all they can to squeeze maximum concessions from the South for the next few years, at least until the major economic artery (oil exports from oil fields in the south going through the north) North is completely cut off. How will they do this? Grandstand on Abyei, dig in in South Kordofan, support armed groups and militias in the south and stoke tribal animosity, etc.

The over 2000km border is going to be the most contentious border in Africa for the next decade. It will not be resolved soon. In fact, I expect the two parties to engage international bodies like the Permanent Court of Arbitration (like they did regarding Abyei) and the UN, thus stalling the finalization of the demarcation. We should also expect plenty of conflicts along this line. Abyei, as some observers have opined, may become the Kashmir of Sudan yet it’s not even as ‘oil-rich’ as many journalists write.

2. Poor Capacity to build:

The task of nation- and state-building is in itself, even in the hands of experts and lots of funds, a most arduous task. The World Bank suggests at least two decades just to arrive at state stability (or ‘breaking even’ in business terms). The problem of weak leadership will be the Achilles’ heel in ROSS’s attempts at state-building. Add to this, UNICEF puts illiteracy as over 80% of the population with only one in four school children being a girl.

Because of this weak capacity to build, there will be numerous models of development and growth that will be forced down the throats of South Sudanese from donors and sadly, this will be like experimentation ground for hitherto untested concepts in development. ROSS leaders should listen to Shanta Devarajan, World Bank’s Chief Economist for Africa; “While welcoming the advice and support from the international community, South Sudan stands a greater chance of success if they can adapt this assistance to local conditions, listening to their people.”

In other words, the international community should only come in to build the capacity of South Sudanese and must not dictate models. The solutions must be indigenously bred and developed if they are to be sustainable.

3. Arms everywhere!

In a recent Small Arms Survey, the presence of militias and numerous armed groups continue to constitute a severe threat to security in post-independence South Sudan. Despite numerous disarmament campaigns (most of them SPLA-led and very bloody in nature), the number of arms in the hands of civilians remains extremely high.

In my own observation, communities that have been marginalized in resource allocations and/or generally perceived as warlike by their neighbours almost always exhibit high saturation of arms. A case in point is the Murle and Mundari of Jonglei state as well as the Lou Nuer in Jonglei and Upper Nile states. Communities refuse to disarm because they feel they are being exposed to enemy communities as the government is not able to provide adequate security. I witnessed a case in Akobo, Jonglei State where 8 SPLA soldiers were killed by a community as they attempted to disarm the latter in December last year. Most communities, however, do want to disarm; but they need guarantees from government and UN that they do not become exposed.

ROSS, in conjunction with UNMISS and other relevant agencies involved with community security like Safer World must work together to design a practical and holistic model for peaceful disarmament and effective DDR.

4. Leadership Deficit:

It is only until recently that almost the entire government leadership cabal was composed of former generals, brigadiers, colonels, lieutenants, majors and other military top brass. Anyone who did not carry a rank was deemed as an outsider; government belonged to those who fought. Since Jan 2005 when the CPA was signed, the GOSS has been heavily accused of mismanagement and high level corruption as well as nepotism. Government jobs and tenders are unashamedly awarded to kith and kin. Resources are channeled to particular leaders’ home areas. This has bred fierce animosity between tribes, marginalization and discrimination of whole communities, some of which are branded as ‘militia tribes’ like the Murle in Jonglei. Community security and programs like disarmament and economic development have all but failed to kick off, further exacerbating a bad case of insecurity and underdevelopment.

In the face of these and many other challenges facing the nascent state, there is a dire need for a new breed of leaders. This must be forward thinking, educated, not loyal to tribe, progressive and responsive to needs of the people. Interethnic conflicts must be resolved through negotiations; civilian disarmament should be done peacefully, preferably under supervision of UNMISS. Educated returnees must be welcomed into government. SPLM must relax its stranglehold on South Sudan politics and allow other parties to thrive without intimidation. A new constitution and followed by democratic elections must be top on government’s list of to-do things.

In short, the new Republic’s leadership needs a complete paradigm shift in its way of thinking.

From Akobo, Jonglei State

Rural women wait in line to register as voters at Akobo town, Jonglei State (Copyright: Josh)

This is my second week at Akobo where I have been conducting a series of workshops on Community Security and Civilian Disarmament (a project of Safer World and UNYMPDA). I have been amazed at the level of mobilization by the county’s administration led by the referendum office and supported by the SSRRC. They are even using boats to reach some far flung bomas (villages) especially near the border with Ethiopia. The level and depth of organization, despite numerous challenges especially of access, is simply amazing. The SSRRC told me that they had set a target of about 15,000 but as at friday, the figure was slightly over 17,000. This is good news. Or is it? Remembering that requirement of at least 60% turnout for a legitimate secession result, the leaders have been asking residents who will not be around to vote not to register. They want at least 80% turnout. I think they’ll get more than that, based on my personal assessment after talking to people. This is good.

 

Returnees arriving in Akobo. Many people have returned to register as voters in the upcoming referendum

How to avoid a war after the Referendum in Sudan

In the recent weeks, Khartoum has increased its rhetoric that there are key post-referendum aspects that must be negotiated and agreed upon before the referendum; otherwise they will not recognize the vote’s outcome. Some key leaders including Pres Omar Bashir have threatened a likelihood of conflict should the vote be held without agreeing on all of these issues. On its hand, the SPLM led by its chairman and southern president Salva Kiir has vowed to go ahead with the vote even if it means unilaterally organizing and conducting it. One might say that the war drums are beating and everyone should prepare for war.

In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that either Khartoum or Juba is willing to bring out the guns again, at least with an intention of another round of full scale war. The costs are just too high and no one is guaranteed of outright and quick victory.

However, there are several things that can be done to mitigate the worst of possibilities and ensure a smooth transition during and after the referendum.

1. Outstanding issues in post-referendum arrangements negotiations: Accept that the referendum does not spell the end of negotiations of key issues. One of the main reasons the mediation that led to the CPA signing succeeded was because the mediators were able to convince the parties (especially NCP) that the signing did not close the door for further consultation and negotiations on the then contentious issues; it was going to provide an interim period to the finalization of these issues.
   1. On Abyei; there is need to mainstream the involvement of the local communities of Dinka Ngok and Misseriya in the negotiations. As witnessed in many other natural resource-based conflicts in Africa, discovery of high value resources has often brought with it conflicts engineered by elites who take advantage of ethnic differences of groups living on such resource finds, yet these groups were living peacefully side by side before the discovery. Clearly, it is the political elites who drive the conflicts and thus the peace talks must be spearheaded by the local communities themselves with political elites only coming in to strengthen what the locals have agreed within the larger government institutions of peace building and economic development.
   2. On border demarcation; the remaining twenty percent that is yet to be demarcated is, as the International Crisis Group noted, a political not technical issue. Examples abound globally where sovereigns are still solving long-standing border issues under the auspices of international dispute resolution mechanisms.
2. Role of IGAD:  Scott Gration can not act like George Mitchell. It is unfortunate that the IGAD team of states which, despite playing a key role in the mediation efforts, has not lived up to its billing as the key local guarantor. This regional body has become a backseat spectator, leaving western nations to take the lead in post-war peace- and state-building and thus giving Khartoum room to rubbish any good-intentioned intervention as ‘meddling in internal affairs of a sovereign state’ and ‘neocolonialism’. The AU, whose key voices include the likes of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, readily fronted this as the basis for refusing to cooperate with international bodies like UNSC, UNAMID and ICC. IGAD must retake the lead role in the Sudan peace efforts. This will deny Khartoum, and by extension the AU, the perfect excuse of non-compliance with its obligations under international law. The international community, especially the US should only come in to complement the efforts of IGAD, just like they led the Troika on nations during the CPA negotiations.
3. Southern unity: the recent conference of political parties held in Juba early October could well be the most critical preparation for separation by the southern leadership. Even if they secede, south Sudan runs a high risk of internal divisions entrenched in years of interethnic conflicts and political divisions. This inter-parties political dialogue is something that the international community should strengthen and institute a thorough follow up to ensure that the resolutions such the multi-stakeholder constitutional conference after the referendum is actually set up. This will guarantee a strong and accountable polity for a future South Sudan state.
4. Immediate recognition of separation vote: The most critical moments will be when the vote is concluded and the ballots are counted. Predictably, there will be many poll-related issues that any party might use to refuse to recognize the outcome. In that very decisive and nail-biting moment, a very hard decision will have to be made not just is Khartoum and Juba but in many capitals all around the world. Analysts expect majority of players in the Khartoum decision-making machine to lean heavily towards non-recognition of separation vote while the one in Juba leans the other way. If there was ever a moment the powder keg that is Sudan can explode, this is it. The question is: will regional and other capitals have the boldness to act swiftly to avert the worst case scenario by promptly and decisively stating their positions without delay? The world will be watching Juba, Khartoum, Nairobi, Washington, Beijing and Cairo and to some extent Addis Ababa for direction in the immediate period following the conclusion of the vote.